Reading Between the Lines:

Leveraging the Assumptions Behind CMMC to Save Time, Money, & Your Sanity

Jacob Horne DefCERT

March 4th, 2021



Goals

Understand the Origins of Technical Debt Assumptions They Make Assumptions You Make




"Your assumptions are your windows on the world. Scrub them off every once in a while, or the light won't come in."

- Isaac Asimov



the WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM ISSUES THE ADMINISTRATION 1600 PENN PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA HOME · BRIEFING ROOM · PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS · PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDA **Briefing Room** The White House Your Weekly Address May 27, 2009 Speeches & Remarks Presidential Memorandum-Press Briefings Statements & Releases **Classified Information and** White House Schedule Controlled Unclassified Information **Presidential Actions** Executive Orders THE WHITE HOUSE **Presidential Memoranda** Office of the Press Secretary Proclamations For Immediate Release May 27, 2009 Legislation MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND Nominations & Appointments AGENCIES SUBJECT: Classified Information and Controlled Unclassified Information Disclosures







the WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

BRIEFING ROOM ISSUES THE ADMINISTRATION

HOME · BRIEFING ROOM · PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS · EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Briefing Room

Your Weekly Address

Speeches & Remarks

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 04, 2010

1600 PENN

Executive Order 13556 -- Controlled Unclassified Information

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Purpose. This order establishes an open and uniform program for managing information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls pursuant to and consistent with law, regulations, and Government-wide policies, excluding information that is classified under Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009, or the Atomic Energy Act, as amended.




Press Briefings Statements & Releases White House Schedule Presidential Actions Executive Orders Presidential Memoranda

Proclamations

Legislation

Nominations & Appointments

Disclosures





A Timeline of Assumptions

Mar 2010

DFARS "RFC" DFARS Case 2008-D028

Nov 2010



Executive Order on America's Supply Chains

Feb 2021

E.O. 14017



Safeguarding Unclassified Information DFARS Case 2008-D028: RFC

March 03, 2010



The DFARS did not address:


- The safeguarding of unclassified DoD information within industry.
- Cyber intrusion reporting for that information.

Purpose:

- Implement adequate security measures to safeguard DoD information on unclassified industry information systems from unauthorized access and disclosure.
- Prescribe reporting to the Government with regard to certain cyber intrusion events that affect DoD information resident or transiting on contractor unclassified information systems.



Safeguarding Unclassified Information DFARS Case 2008-D028: RFC





A Timeline of Assumptions

Mar 2010	Jun 2011	
•	•	
DFARS "RFC"	Proposed Rule	
DFARS Case	DFARS Case	
2008-D028	2011-D039	

Nov 2010



Feb 2021



Safeguarding Unclassified DoD Information DFARS Case 2011-D039: Proposed Rule

June 28, 2011




<u>Objective</u>:

- Avoid compromise of unclassified computer networks on which DoD information is resident on or transiting through contractor information systems.
- Prevent the exfiltration of DoD information on such systems.




Safeguarding Unclassified DoD Information DFARS Case 2011-D039: Proposed Rule





Safeguarding Unclassified DoD Information DFARS Case 2011-D039: Proposed Rule



• Basic protection are routine business.

• Some unclassified DoD data requires special handling and reporting.

"Reasonable Rule of Thumb"

Small business security budget: 0.5% of total revenues



<u>A Timeline of Assumptions</u>





E.O. 14017



Basic Safeguarding of Contractor Information Systems FAR Case 2011-020: Proposed Rule


August 24, 2012

The FAR did not address:

• The safeguarding of contractor information systems that contain or process information provided by or generated for the Government (other than public information).

Objective:

 Improve the protection of information provided by or generated for the Government (other than public information) that will be resident on or transiting through contractor information systems by employing basic security measures, as identified in the clause to appropriately protect information provided by or generated for the Government (other than public information) that will be resident on or transiting through contractor information systems from unauthorized disclosure, loss, or compromise.





Basic Safeguarding of Contractor Information Systems

FAR Case 2011-020: Proposed Rule

August 24, 2012



Basic Safeguarding of Unclassified Information Within Industry

Requires the contractor to provide protective measures to information provided by or generated for the Government (other than public information) that will be resident on or transiting through contractor information systems in the following areas:


- Public computers or Web sites.
- Transmitting electronic information.
- Transmitting voice and fax information.
- Physical and electronic barriers.
- Sanitization.
- Intrusion protection.
- Transfer limitations

"This proposed rule applies to all Federal contractors and appropriate subcontractors regardless of size or business ownership."



"The resultant cost impact is considered not significant, since the first-level protective measures (i.e., updated virus protection, the latest security software patches, etc.) are typically employed as part of the routine course of doing business."

A Timeline of Assumptions





Feb 2021



Safeguarding Unclassified Controlled Technical Information DFARS Case 2011-D039: Final Rule

November 17, 2013



Safeguarding of Unclassified Controlled Technical Information

- Reduced scope of information covered.
- Information retention requirement: 90 days.
- 13 pieces of reportable information.

- No Federal CUI Policy for Agencies.
- No Federal CUI Policy for Industry.
- DoD has existing authority to protect CTI.



Safeguarding Unclassified Controlled Technical Information DFARS Case 2011-D039: Final Rule

November 17, 2013



Safeguarding of Unclassified Controlled Technical Information


- Increased costs accounted for through the normal course of business
- Costs are spread across multiple contracts
- Costs are allowable: chargeable to indirect cost pools.
- NIST SP 800-53 controls closely parallel mainstream ISO 27002, therefore costs are reasonable.

"The Government does not intend to directly pay for the operating costs associated with the rule."

😵 DEFCERT


"The contractor's size classification is not a sufficient reason to allow a contractor to fail to protect technical information as required by clause 252.204-7012."

<u>A Timeline of Assumptions</u>












	Assume: Nonfederal organizations are -
NIST Special Publication 800-171 Revision 2 Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations	Not developing or acquiring systems specifically for the purpose of processing, storing, or transmitting CUI.
RON ROSS VICTORIA PILLITTERI KELLEY DEMPSEY MARK RIDDLE GARY GUISSANIE This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-171r2	"Whatever we were going to do with regard to requirements, it would be relatively comfortable for those organizations in-line with what they're already doing to continue what they were already doing."
	- Dr. Ron Ross, NIST Fellow (2015)
National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce	







<text><text><section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><text><text></text></text></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header></text></text>	"Now, it could happen that some of our assumptions (the things that we thought they were doing – they may not be doing) but again, we had to make some design decisions on how these requirements came out." - Dr. Ron Ross, NIST Fellow (2015)
National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce	



SP 800-171, REVIS	ISION 2 PROTECTING CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION	
APPENDIX	E	
TAILORI	NG CRITERIA	
LISTING OF M	IODERATE SECURITY CONTROL BASELINE AND TAILORING ACTIONS	
one of describ that have be by NIST and requirement	pendix provides a list of the security controls in the [<u>SP 800-53</u>] ³⁶ moderate baseline, the sources along with [<u>FIP5 200</u>], used to develop the CUI security requirements bed in <u>Chapter Three</u> . Tables E1 through E-12 contain the specific tailoring actions ern carried out on the controls in accordance with the tailoring criteria established NRAR. The tailoring actions facilitated the development of the CUI derived security ts which supplement the basic security requirements. ³⁷ There are three primary sliminating a security control or control enhancement from the moderate baseline	
	trol or control enhancement is uniquely federal (i.e., primarily the responsibility of eral government);	
 The cont of CUI;³⁸ 	trol or control enhancement is not directly related to protecting the confidentiality ${}^{\scriptscriptstyle \rm I\!I}$ or	
	trol or control enhancement is expected to be routinely satisfied by nonfederal ations without specification. ³⁹	
	ig symbols in Table E are used in Tables E-1 through E-17 to specify the tailoring in or when no tailoring actions were required.	
	TABLE E: TAILORING ACTION SYMBOLS	
TAILORING SYMBOL	TAILORING CRITERIA	
NCO	NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF CUI.	
FED	UNIQUELY FEDERAL, PRIMARILY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.	
NFO	EXPECTED TO BE ROUTINELY SATISFIED BY NONFEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT SPECIFICATION.	
	THE CUI BASIC OR DERIVED SECURITY REQUIREMENT IS REFLECTED IN AND IS TRACEABLE TO THE SECURITY	

in the (59 R00-33) moderate baseline that support protection against unauthorized disclosure also support protection against unauthorized modification. ** The security controls tailored out of the moderate baseline (i.e., controls specifically marked as either NCO or NFO

and highlighted in the darker blue shading in Tables E-1 through E-17], are often included as part of an organization comprehensive security program.

APPENDIX E

PAGE 84

62 "NFO" Controls

"We went through and took a hard look and said, 'Do you think we have to tell people to do this? Or should that be kind of expected?"

"In the modern world of running information systems and having security programs – these requirements – we think that we don't have to tell people to do them."

- Dr. Ron Ross, NIST Fellow (2015)



SP 800-171, REVI	SION 2	PROTECTING CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
APPENDIX	E	
TAILORI	NG CRITERIA	
LISTING OF M	ODERATE SECURITY CONTROL	LBASELINE AND TAILORING ACTIONS
one of describ that have be by NIST and requirement criteria for e including—	the sources along with [FIP: ed in <u>Chapter Three</u> . Tables en carried out on the contrn NARA. The tailoring actions s which supplement the bas liminating a security contro	security controls in the [<u>SP 800-S3</u>] ⁵⁶ moderate baseline, <u>(S 200)</u> , used to develop the CUI security requirements <u>(S 200)</u> , used to develop the CUI security requirements se 1- through E-17 contain the specific tailoring actions rols in accordance with the tailoring criteria established <u>(S 200)</u> for a security security sic security requirements. ³⁷ There are three primary of control enhancement from the moderate baseline at is uniquely federal (i.e., primarily the responsibility of
	ral government);	
 The cont of CUI;³⁸ 		it is not directly related to protecting the confidentiality
	rol or control enhancement tions without specification.	nt is expected to be routinely satisfied by nonfederal
	g symbols in Table E are use n or when no tailoring actio	ed in Tables E-1 through E-17 to specify the tailoring ons were required.
	TABLE E:	TAILORING ACTION SYMBOLS
TAILORING SYMBOL		TAILORING CRITERIA
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FED		HE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
NFO		SFIED BY NONFEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT SPECIFICATION.
CUI		RITY REQUIREMENT IS REFLECTED IN AND IS TRACEABLE TO THE SECURITY ENT, OR SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE CONTROL/ENHANCEMENT.
tables will be u baseline consis future updates	pdated upon publication of [<u>SP 80</u> tent with NIST Special Publication to the basic and derived security	14 are taken from NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4. These 00-53B which will provide an update to the moderate security control 800-53, Revision 5. Changes to the moderate baseline will affect requirements in <u>Chapter Three</u> . security requirements in [EPS 200] resulting in the CUI basic security

³⁹ The security controls tailored out of the moderate baseline (i.e., controls specifically marked as either NCO or NFO and highlighted in the darker blue shading in Tables E-1 through E-17), are often included as part of an organization's comprehensive security program.

PAGE 84

62 "NFO" Controls

"Got rid of all of the "-1 controls". The first control. The policy and procedures control. We took those out because we assumed that organizations that are complying would most likely have policies and procedures. **That was not something that we wanted to tell them to do.**

- Dr. Ron Ross, NIST Fellow (2015)



SP 800-171, REV	SION 2	PROTECTING CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
APPENDIX	E	
TAILORI	NG CRITERIA	
	ODERATE SECURITY CONTROL BASELI	INE AND TAILORING ACTIONS
descril that have be by NIST and requiremen	ed in <u>Chapter Three</u> . Tables E-1 th en carried out on the controls in a NARA. The tailoring actions facilita s which supplement the basic sect	used to develop the CUI security requirements rrough E-17 contain the specific tailoring actions accordance with the tailoring criteria established ated the development of the CUI derived security urity requirements. ¹⁷ There are three primary ntrol enhancement from the moderate baseline
	rol or control enhancement is uni ral government);	quely federal (i.e., primarily the responsibility of
 The con of CUI;³ 		t directly related to protecting the confidentiality
	rol or control enhancement is exp tions without specification. ³⁹	pected to be routinely satisfied by nonfederal
	g symbols in Table E are used in Ta n or when no tailoring actions wer	ables E-1 through E-17 to specify the tailoring re required.
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TAILORING	т/	AILORING CRITERIA
SYMBOL	NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO PROTECTING TH	IE CONFIDENTIALITY OF CUI.
NCO	UNIQUELY FEDERAL PRIMARILY THE RESPO	INSIBILITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
	and a state of the rest of the rest of	
NCO FED NFO	EXPECTED TO BE ROUTINELY SATISFIED BY N	NONFEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT SPECIFICATION.
NCO FED	EXPECTED TO BE ROUTINELY SATISFIED BY N THE CUI BASIC OR DERIVED SECURITY REQU	NONFEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT SPECIFICATION. IREMENT IS BEFLECTED IN AND IS TRACEABLE TO THE SECURITY PECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE CONTROL/ENHANCEMENT.

62 "NFO" Controls

SA – 9 External Information System Services


- a. Require that providers of external system services comply with organizational security and privacy requirements...
- b. Define and document organizational oversight and user roles and responsibilities with regard to external system services...
- c. Employ the following processes, methods, and techniques to monitor control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis...



APPENDIX E

PAGE 84

A Timeline of Assumptions







DFARS Case 2011-D018: Interim Rule

August 25, 2015




Objective:

- Improve information security for DoD information stored on or transiting contractor systems as well as in a cloud environment.
- Urgent and compelling reasons exist to promulgate this interim rule...urgent need to protect covered defense information and gain awareness of the full scope of cyber incidents being committed against defense contractors.
- Recent high-profile breaches of Federal information show the need to ensure that information security protections are clearly, effectively, and consistently addressed in contracts



DFARS Case 2011-D018: Interim Rule




incidents involving this new class of information ng fields v require an

"Of the required reporting fields several of them will likely require an information technology expert to provide information describing the cyber incident or at least to determine what information was affected, to be noted in the report."



DFARS Case 2011-D018: Interim Rule




NIST SP 800-171 Replaces 800-53 Controls

Reduces required tasks by:

30%



A Timeline of Assumptions






Feb 2021



DFARS Case 2011-D018: Interim Rule



Compliance with Safeguarding Covered Defense Information Controls

Safeguarding Covered Defense Information & Cyber Incident Reporting


Amending to provide additional time

Implementation Deadline:

Dec 31, 2017



A Timeline of Assumptions







DFARS Case 2011-D018: Final Rule

October 21, 2016




Objective:

• Improve information security for DoD information stored on or transiting contractor systems as well as in a cloud environment.



Network Penetration Testing & Contracting for Cloud Services

DFARS Case 2011-D018: Final Rule




"Implementing the minimum-security controls outlined in the DFARS clause may increase costs, protection of unclassified DoD information is deemed necessary." "Implementation of the NIST SP 800-171 security requirements will provide significant benefit to the small business community in the form of increased protection of their intellectual property."



Network Penetration Testing & Contracting for Cloud Services

DFARS Case 2011-D018: Final Rule



"The cost of compliance with the requirements of this rule is unknown as the cost is determined based on the make-up of the information system and the current state of security already in place."



Network Penetration Testing & Contracting for Cloud Services DFARS Case 2011-D018: Final Rule

October 21, 2016 DFARS 252.204-7008 (Provision) DFARS 252.204-7012 (Clause)

Compliance with Safeguarding Covered Defense Information Controls

"The security requirements in NIST SP 800-171 build upon the table of controls contained in the November 2013 version of DFARS clause 252.204-7012.

While there is additional effort for the difference, none of the effort to implement the original controls is lost."

Safeguarding Covered Defense Information & Cyber Incident Reporting


"DoD does not develop "cost recovery models" for compliance with DFARS rules.

The requirements levied by this rule should be treated the same as those levied by any other new DFARS rule and the cost related to compliance should be considered during proposal preparation."



Network Penetration Testing & Contracting for Cloud Services

DFARS Case 2011-D018: Final Rule



Compliance with Safeguarding Covered Defense Information Controls


Safeguarding Covered Defense Information & Cyber Incident Reporting

"Cyber incident reporting, media preservation, and system access are not part of the contractor's adequate security obligations, but rather distinct requirements of the clause when a cyber incident occurs on a covered contractor information system."



Network Penetration Testing & Contracting for Cloud Services

DFARS Case 2011-D018: Final Rule




Alternative Paths Considered for Small Entities:

- An exemption.
- Delaying for further costs analysis.
- Creating a different set of security requirements.

"Rejected as conflicting with the overarching purpose of this rule which is to increase the security of unclassified information that DoD has determined could result in harm if released." "Regardless of the size of the contractor or subcontractor handling the information, the protection level of that information needs to be the same across the board."







Feb 2021




Basic Safeguarding of Covered Contractor Information Systems FAR Case 2011-020: Final Rule



- <u>Objective</u>: of this rule is to require contractors to employ basic security measures, as identified in the clause, for any covered contractor information system.
- This final rule has basic safeguarding measures that are generally employed as part of the routine course of doing business.
- Provides for safeguarding the contractor information system, rather than specific information contained in the system.

"This rule, which focuses on ensuring a basic level of safeguarding for any contractor system with Federal information, reflective of actions a prudent business-person would employ, is just one step in a series of coordinated regulatory actions being taken or planned to strengthen protections of information systems."








Feb 2021

Executive Order on America's Supply

Chains

E.O. 14017



National Security

Jun 2018

SEADRAGON

China hacked a Navy contractor and secured a trove of highly sensitive data on submarine warfare



China's sole operating aircraft carrier leaves Dalian in northeast China for sea trials last month. (Li Gang/Xinhua/AP)


By Ellen Nakashima and Paul Sonne

June 8, 2018 at 12:04 p.m. PDT

Feb 2021









Level 3	
AC.3.017	Separate the duties of individuals to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion.
AC.3.018	Prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions and capture the execution of such functions in audit logs.
AC.3.019	Terminate (automatically) user sessions after a defined condition.

Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification | Version 1.02



12

	es are presented in the order in which they appear in the <i>CMMC Model Matrix</i> from ottom, not numerical order.
AC.3.01	7
Separat	e the duties of individuals to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion
ASSESS	MENT OBJECTIVES [NIST SP 800-171A]
Determ	ine if:
[a] the	duties of individuals requiring separation are defined;
[b] resp and	onsibilities for duties that require separation are assigned to separate individuals;
and the second second second	ss privileges that enable individuals to exercise the duties that require separation granted to separate individuals.
DOTEN	TIAL ASSESSMENT METHODS AND OBJECTS [NIST SP 800-171A]

[SELECT FROM: Access control policy; procedures addressing divisions of responsibility and separation of duties; system security plan; system configuration settings and associated documentation; list of divisions of responsibility and separation of duties; system access authorizations; system audit logs and records; other relevant documents or records].

Interview

[SELECT FROM: Personnel with responsibilities for defining divisions of responsibility and separation of duties; personnel with information security responsibilities; system or network administrators].


Test

[SELECT FROM: Mechanisms implementing separation of duties policy].



CMMC Level 3

- 130 Requirements
- 383 Practice Objectives
- 323 Process Objectives
- 706 Total •
- 50% 70% Non-technical



November 30, 2020



<u>Objective</u>: Provide the Department with:

- The ability to assess contractor implementation of NIST SP 800-171 security requirements.
- Assurances that DIB contractors can adequately protect sensitive unclassified information at a level commensurate with the risk, accounting for information flowed down to subcontractors in a multi-tier supply chain.

Neither the FAR clause, nor the DFARS clause, provide for DoD verification of a contractor's implementation of basic safeguarding requirements or the security requirements specified in NIST SP 800-171 prior to contract award.



Assessing Contractor Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements

DFARS Case 2019-D041: Interim Rule

November 30, 2020

DFARS 252.204-7019 (Provision)

Notice of NIST SP 800-171 DoD Assessment Requirements



DFARS 252.204-7020 (Clause)

NIST SP 800-171 DoD Assessment Requirements

DFARS 252.204-7021 (Clause)

Top five NAICS code industries expected to be impacted:

- 541712: Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences
- 541330: Engineering Services
- 236220: Commercial and Institutional Building Construction
- 541519: Other Computer Related Services
- 561210: Facilities Support Services.

These NAICS codes were selected based on a review of NAICS codes associated with awards that include the clause at DFARS 252.204-7012.



November 30, 2020

 November 30, 2020


 Image: Constraint of the second se

• Added to all solicitations and contracts

- Basic, Medium, & High Assessments
- Added to all solicitations and contracts
- Requires a contractor to provide the Government with access to its facilities, systems, and personnel when it is necessary for DoD to conduct or renew a higher-level Assessment.

then must have current assessment score on record in SPRS






- A contractor should already be aware of the security requirements they have not yet implemented and have documented plans of action for those requirements.
- Therefore, the burden associated with conducting a self-assessment is the time burden associated with calculating the score:

30 Minutes



Assessing Contractor Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements

DFARS Case 2019-D041: Interim Rule



While these are rather simple tasks that can reasonably be completed by a GS-11 equivalent employee, or even a GS-9 clerk, the GS-13 (or perhaps GS-11) is the most likely grade for several reasons.

- 1. First, in a small company, the number of IT personnel are very limited. The employee that is available to complete this task would also have significant responsibilities for operation and maintenance of the IT system and, therefore, be at a higher grade than would otherwise be required if the only job was to prepare and submit the assessment.
- 2. Second, while the calculation of the assessment is simple, the personnel who would typically have access to and understand the system security plan and plans of action in order to complete the Basic Assessment would be at the higher grade.
- 3. Third, while the actual submission is a simple task, the person who would complete the assessment and submit the data in SPRS would be the person with SPRS access/responsibilities, and therefore at the higher grade.
- 4. Fourth, given that proper calculation of the score and its submission may well determine whether or not the company is awarded the contract, the persons preparing and submitting the report are likely to be at a higher grade than is actually required to ensure this is done properly.



November 30, 2020 Q DFARS 252.204-7021 (Clause)

Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification Requirements

- Will apply to all DoD solicitations and contracts after October 1, 2025.
- Required for contract award/option.
- Requires a contractor to ensure that its subcontractors also have the appropriate CMMC level prior to awarding a subcontract or other contractual instruments.
- In order to achieve a specific CMMC level, a DIB company must demonstrate both process institutionalization or maturity and the implementation of practices commensurate with that level.



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Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification Requirements

The estimated costs attributed to this rule do not include the costs associated with compliance with the existing cybersecurity requirements under the clause at FAR 52.204-21 or associated with implementing NIST SP 800-171 in accordance with the clause at DFARS 252.204-7012.

Contractors who have been awarded a DoD contract that include these existing contract clauses should have already implemented these cybersecurity requirements and incurred the associated costs; therefore, those costs are not attributed to this rule.

The rollout is intended to minimize the financial impacts to the industrial base, especially small entities, and disruption to the existing DoD supply chain.



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Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification Requirements

Level 1 Certification

- Level 1 Assessment or recertification is **\$2,999.56** (small entity):
 - Contractor Support: one employee 14 hours \$1,166.48.
 - C3PAO Assessment: one assessor 19 hours \$1,833.08.

Contractors pursuing a Level 1 Certification should have already implemented the 15 existing basic safeguarding requirements under FAR clause 52.204-21.Therefore, there are no estimated nonrecurring or recurring engineering costs associated with CMMC Level 1.



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Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification Requirements

Level 2 Certification

- Level 2 Assessment or recertification: \$22,466.88 (small entity):
 - Contractor Support: Two employees 48 hours each \$11,239.68.
 - C3PAO Assessment: Two assessors 45 hours each \$11,227.20.
- Nonrecurring engineering cost: **\$8,135**.
- Recurring engineering cost: **\$20,154** per year.

Contractors pursuing a Level 2 Certification should have already implemented the 65 existing NIST SP 800-171 security requirements.

Therefore, the estimated engineering costs per small entity is associated with implementation of 9 new requirements (7 CMMC practices and 2 CMMC processes).

The phased rollout estimates that approximately 10% of small entities may choose to use Level 2 as a transition step from Level 1 to Level 3.

The Department does not anticipate releasing new contracts that require contractors to achieve CMMC Level 2.



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Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification Requirements


Level 3 Certification

- Level 3 assessment or recertification: **\$51,095.60** (small entity):
 - Contractor Support: three employees 64 hours each **\$22,479.36.**
 - C3PAO Assessment: Four assessors 57 hours each \$28,616.24.
- Nonrecurring engineering cost: **\$26,214**.
- Recurring engineering cost: **\$41,666** per year.

Contractors pursuing a Level 3 Certification should have already implemented the 110 existing NIST SP 800-171 security requirements.

Therefore, the estimated engineering costs per small entity is associated with implementation 23 new requirements (20 CMMC practices and 3 CMMC processes).







Common Assumptions




Assumptions to Avoid



Only 130 Technical Requirements.

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Your managed IT service provider ("MSP") has things under control.

Scope of DFARS Cybersecurity = NIST SP 800-171.

The CMMC Accrediting Body is in charge.

Your customers will provide scalable, compliant infrastructure.

SPRS "Implemented" = CMMC Assessable.

There will be monetary relief.

You don't have to flow down.





Cost is a function of the scope of your covered contractor information system.



The scope of your covered contractor information system is a function of how CUI and FCI flows through your business.



Evaluate vendors, technologies, and consultants on whether they provide scope assessments rather than just "gap assessments".



"Security is an allowable cost. We need you to build it into your rate. If you go to the Federal Register, we put in very clearly what we thought were good estimates on how much it would cost. We took into consideration how long we thought it would take a company to prepare and the cost to do that (to prepare for the audit). To actually have the audit and then the clean up from the audit to make sure that they got everything done. So, we included that, so we want you to build that into your rate."

- Katie Arrington, February 17^{th,} 2021





DEFECENCE IN CONTEXT

jacob.horne@defcert.com www.defcert.com